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Bankruptcy and the Administrative State
by
ROBERT KENNETH RASMUSSEN*
The main challenge currently facing lawyers and lawmakers is
integrating the public and private law regimes. These two systems start
from different premises and often appear to conflict with one an-
other.1 Nowhere is this conflict more evident than in bankruptcy law.
Although bankruptcy law is generally conceived to be a private law
regime, the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not remove a debtor
from the reach of public law: states attempt to force debtors to fulfill
their obligations under the environmental laws;2 banking authorities
strive to impose their regulatory strictures on bank holding companies
that have filed for bankruptcy; 3 the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") still prosecutes unfair labor practice complaints against
firms that have entered bankruptcy; 4 the Secretary of Labor still seeks
to enjoin firms from selling goods made by employees who were not
paid the minimum wage; 5 the public utilities commission continues to
demand the right to approve structural changes contained in public
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1. These divergent premises can be seen by comparing the work of Professor Richard
Epstein, who is perhaps the most ardent proponent of minimal governmental restraints on
private ordering, with that of Professor Cass Sunstein, who argues for an explicit rejection of
private ordering as the baseline for legal doctrine. Compare R.A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGs: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND TIM POWER OF EmmENr DomAIN (1985) and Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987
Term: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L.
REV. 4, 102-03 (1988) and Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV.
947, 953 (1984) with Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HAnv. L.
REV. 405, 408-11 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes] and Sunstein, Constitu-
tionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REv. 421, 437-46 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.
494, 504-06 (1986); Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 274
(3d Cir. 1984).
3. See In re MCorp, 101 Bankr. 483, 486-87 (S.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd sub nom. MCorp
Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990).
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. Superior Forwarding, Inc., 762 F.2d 695, 696 (8th Cir. 1985).
5. See Brock v. Rusco Indus., 842 F.2d 270, 273 (11th Cir. 1988); Donovan v. TMC
Indus., 20 Bankr. 997, 1005-06 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
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utility plans of reorganization; 6 and the Department of Justice pursues
recovery under the False Claims Act from bankrupt companies that
have defrauded the federal government. 7 In these situations, and in
countless others, courts are called upon to reconcile what often are
viewed as the competing claims of the bankruptcy process and those
of the administrative state.
Bankruptcy theorists have yet to advance a normative explanation
of the proper relationship between bankruptcy and the administrative
state.8 The most complete model of bankruptcy advanced to date-the
creditors' bargain model 9-takes no account of the administrative state
in attempting to formulate the basic principles of bankruptcy. This
model relentlessly reduces all disputes between a debtor and its cred-
itors to the private law paradigm of a private creditor suing the debtor.
In this Article, I integrate the administrative state into bankruptcy
theory. I begin by delineating the creditors' bargain model, both to
show its explanatory strength and to demonstrate its failure to consider
the intrusion of public law in bankruptcy. Two important points
emerge. First, the collective action problem that is at the heart of the
creditors' bargain model only justifies preventing creditors from grab-
bing the debtor's assets; it does not justify resolving disputes between
debtor and creditor in the bankruptcy forum. The justification for
resolving such disputes in a particular forum is based strictly on a cost-
benefit analysis: given that there are at least two possible forums for
hearing the dispute, the cheaper forum should be used. The second
point is that the creditors' bargain model assumes that bankruptcy
courts are institutionally capable of resolving all nonbankruptcy dis-
putes.
In Part II of this Article, I demonstrate the fallacy of this as-
sumption. This Part canvasses the normative underpinnings of ad-
6. See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co., 108 Bankr. 854 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989).
7. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 115 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re
Commonwealth Cos., 80 Bankr. 162 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
8. To date, the only work that draws on principles of administrative law in attempting
to resolve questions in bankruptcy focuses exclusively on the utilities industry. See Eisenberg,
Bankruptcy in the Administrative State, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1987). This Article,
in contrast, focuses on the interaction of bankruptcy and administrative law with respect to
all debtors. For a critique of the conclusions drawn by Professor Eisenberg, see infra note 79.
9. The principal developers of the creditors' bargain model of bankruptcy have been
Professor Douglas Baird and Dean Thomas Jackson. See T.H. JACKSON, Tim LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986) [hereinafter T.H. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITs]; Baird &
Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A
Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. REV.
97 (1984) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations]; Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) [hereinafter
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements].
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ministrative law, showing that courts should respect agency decisions
because of the institutional advantages agencies have in both expertise
and political accountability. Unlike courts, agencies overtly are charged
with choosing between competing policies based on their view of which
policy is the best. This being the case, courts are institutionally in-
capable of replicating the decisionmaking processes of administrative
agencies.
In the final Part of this Article, I craft a theory of bankruptcy
that incorporates the administrative state. Using the insights of ad-
ministrative law, the Article creates a framework for deciding when
disputes should be resolved in bankruptcy and when they should be
resolved in the nonbankruptcy forum. This framework differs sig-
nificantly both from that suggested by the creditors' bargain model
and from that found in existing case law. Whereas the creditors' bar-
gain model too often would force disputes into bankruptcy by failing
to account for the unique nature of the administrative state, existing
law too often allows disputes to be resolved outside of bankruptcy by
focusing on the motivation of the government rather than on concerns
of institutional competence. By focusing on such concerns, my theory
harmonizes the respective goals of bankruptcy and administrative law.
I. The Policies Underlying Bankruptcy Law
Federal bankruptcy law alters some of the rules governing the
nonbankruptcy relationship between a debtor 10 and its creditors. Out-
side of bankruptcy, a creditor has a number of means by which to
extract payment from a recalcitrant debtor. She can, for example, de-
mand the debtor repay the debt, refuse to deal further with the debtor
until the debt is repaid, or threaten to tell the world that the debtor
is a deadbeat. If these means of persuasion fail, the creditor can file
a lawsuit against the debtor and, assuming the suit is successful, obtain
a judgment lien and have the sheriff foreclose on the debtor's prop-
erty. So long as the creditor does not steal the debtor's property, the
principal limits on her methods of collection (at least where no con-
sumer is involved) are those of her imagination." The Bankruptcy Code
10. Technically, the Bankruptcy Code refers not to the "debtor" but rather to the
"trustee" (when one has been appointed to run the firm), see 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-705 (1988),
or the "debtor in possession" (when the old managers continue to operate the firm), see § 11
U.S.C. § 1101 (1988). For simplicity, I use the term "debtor" to refer to both entities.
11. Numerous federal and state laws limit creditors' means of collecting from consumers.
E.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1922 (1988). For examples of
state collection law, see CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §§ 481.010-709 (West 1976) (describing various
means of collection including attachment, wage garnishment, and liens, as well as detailing
applicable exemptions); N.Y. Civ. PRc. L. & R. arts. 62-71 (McKinney 1990) (detailing
grounds and procedures for attachment and recovery of chattel).
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radically constrains these various avenues of debt collection and forces
creditors to pursue their claims in the bankruptcy forum. 12 Indeed, if
a creditor pursues nonbankruptcy remedies after a bankruptcy petition
has been filed, she can be forced to pay damages to the debtor. 3 This
alteration of the debtor-creditor relationship is one of the defining
attributes of bankruptcy.
Although bankruptcy alters state debt collection law, many (per-
haps most) nonbankruptcy rules governing the debtor's conduct re-
main intact. A debtor in bankruptcy may not sell cocaine, no matter
how profitable this activity might be; it cannot get a court to order
people to buy its wares, even though such an order might ensure prof-
itability; nor can it force its employees to stay on the job, even if the
loss of employees would doom the enterprise. The filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition simply does not liberate a firm from all of the con-
straints that governed its behavior prior to the filing.' 4
Any systematic attempt to demarcate appropriate limits for bank-
ruptcy law's alteration of nonbankruptcy rules must begin by iden-
tifying the policies of bankruptcy law. The creditors' bargain model
of bankruptcy attempts to do so. 15 It explains bankruptcy as a set of
rules that creditors would agree upon were they able to do so. 16 Though
it provides significant insights into the nature of bankruptcy,' 7 this
theory is also quite limited. It focuses exclusively on the relationship
between the debtor and private creditors. To the extent that the cred-
itors' bargain model acknowledges that the government might be a
creditor, it forces the government into the private party paradigm.
This section briefly explicates the creditors' bargain model, illustrating
its explanatory power and exposing its limits.
The creditors' bargain model illuminates the problem which bank-
ruptcy addresses by positing a world without federal bankruptcy law.'S
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988) (creditors stayed from recovering against debtor through
nonbankruptcy means once petition has been filed).
13. Id. § 362(h).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988) (requiring the debtor to observe all state laws in
managing the estate).
15. See D.G. BAIRD & T.H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY
39-42 (2d ed. 1990); T.H. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMIrs, supra note 9, at 2-4.
16. See T.H. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 9, at 10-19; Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 9, at 860.
17. These insights are acknowledged in Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors'
Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. Rav. 690, 692 (1986) (reviewing D.G. BAIRD & T.H. JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15); see also Eisenberg, A
Bankruptcy Machine That Would Go of Itself, 39 STAN. L. Rav. 1519, 1520-21 (1987) (reviewing
T.H. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 9).
18. See T.H. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 9, at 8-10.
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This world is not the product of academic speculation; it is the world
in which the American economy operated for most of the nineteenth
century. 19 In this bankruptcy-free world, a creditor's ability to obtain
repayment often depends on the means she can employ to collect the
debt. In general, state law offers creditors a wide variety of collection
remedies, from gentle persuasion to state assistance. 20
When the debtor is solvent, this debt collection system works rea-
sonably well. The debtor will pay most of its debts in the ordinary
course of business. Most firms willingly pay their debts when they are
flush, either because they want to protect their reputations, or because
they fear the use of more drastic debt collection measures. Occa-
sionally, the debtor may dispute the existence of a debt. Such disputes,
however, can be resolved through negotiation or, if necessary, in a
court of law. Though the creditor, the debtor, or both may be dis-
satisfied with the substance of nonbankruptcy law (for example, tort
claimants and defendants both may view substantive tort law as too
unpredictable'), the procedures for enforcing nonbankruptcy entitle-
ments are relatively efficacious.
Problems in the state law collection process arise when the debtor
becomes insolvent and no longer has assets sufficient to cover its li-
abilities. The inevitable result of such a state of affairs is that astute
creditors begin a race to collect on their debts. The cause for this race
is found in the state collection law priority rules that govern the claims
of competing creditors. These state collection laws provide that the
basic priority rule among unsecured creditors2 is first-come, first-
served.2 The result of this rule is that those creditors who receive pay-
ment from an insolvent debtor walk away satisfied, while those who
are not paid before the debtor's assets are exhausted are left with
worthless claims. Since each creditor looks after only its own interests,
each has an incentive to secure repayment before its fellow creditors,
knowing that it will not be repaid if it is last in line. As soon as it
19. A brief description of bankruptcy law in the 19th century can be found in L.M.
F~EDMaN, A HISTORY OF AMERCAN LAW 269-75 (2d ed. 1985).
20. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the wide range in damage awards for similarly situated tort
victims, and a suggested response to such variations, see Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, Valuing
Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 908 (1989).
22. In this summary, I do not deal with the role of secured creditors in the creditors'
bargain model. For a normative treatment of such creditors, see Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 9, at 868-71; Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations,
supra note 9, at 109-16. Recently, this treatment has been seriously questioned. See Baird &
Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEoAL
S2. 311 (1991).
23. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 5202, 5203, 5232, 5234(b) (McKinney 1990).
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perceives the possibility that some creditors will not be paid, each cred-
itor has a strong incentive to invoke available collection measures in
an attempt to avoid being that unlucky soul. 4
Because all creditors have the same incentive, this first-come, first-
served method eventually leads to the piecemeal liquidation of the in-
solvent debtor's assets. As each creditor rushes to satisfy its claim, the
debtor can either voluntarily sell all of its assets, paying as many claims
as possible with the proceeds, or refuse to pay its outstanding obli-
gations. In the latter case, the creditors will force the involuntary sale
of assets through state law collection proceedings. Either way, the re-
sult is the same-the debtor's assets are sold in a piecemeal fashion,
giving the proceeds to those creditors who acted expeditiously, and
leaving the remaining creditors with claims against a debtor who now
owns no assets with which to satisfy their claims. Insolvency thus trig-
gers a race for the debtor's assets, which ultimately divests the debtor
of the control of these assets.
The mere fact that state law debt collection remedies lead to a
race, however, does not justify a new set of rules. Races in and of
themselves are not necessarily bad. Indeed, some creditor monitoring
may be a beneficial constraint on debtor misbehavior .2 5 In the insol-
vency context, however, the race to the debtor's assets may be contrary
to the best interests of the creditors as a group. A firm's insolvency
does not necessarily reflect on whether the firm's assets are being put
to their most efficient use. The fact that a firm has liabilities that ex-
ceed its assets may not mean that those assets should be sold in a
piecemeal fashion. Oftentimes a firm's assets are worth more as part
of a going concern than they would be if sold separately. 26
The distinction between solvency and the value of a positive going
concern has been highlighted by the current levels of corporate debt.
24. See T.H. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LMITS, supra note 9, at 14-15.
25. For discussions of creditors as monitors of a debtor firm's actions, see Easterbrook
& Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 100-101 (1985);
Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143,
1158-61 (1979); Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49, 68-75 (1982).
26. Such a surplus in value can result either from the synergistic effect of combining the
debtor's assets or from the unique contribution made by current management. Distinguishing
between these two types of contributions in a reorganization is the function of the absolute
priority rule of 11 U.S.C. § 1129. The classic treatment of the absolute priority rule can be
found in Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganizations, 17 U. CHI. L. REv.
565, 572 (1950). For a recent discussion of the rule, see Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority
after Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 963, 999-1001 (1989); Baird & Picker, supra note 22, at 325-
28. For an argument that the rule fails in its central purpose, see Baird & Jackson, Bargaining
After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHn. L. REv. 738, 746-
47 (1988).
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Many corporations that technically are insolvent because of their junk
bond obligations undoubtedly should be kept intact. That Federated
Department Stores (which owns Bloomingdale's) had more liabilities
than assets does not mean the preferable course of action would have
been to dissolve the company and sell its assets to third parties. 27
It is readily apparent that creditors, who are in effect the residual
claimants of the insolvent company, are better off if firms with pos-
itive going-concern values are kept intact. They are better off because
as a group they will receive more on their claims if the firm remains
intact. To be sure, some creditors-the ones who would have won the
race-may be worse off if the firm is kept intact. However, it is un-
likely that a creditor who has lent to a number of firms will be first
in line every time one of its debtors becomes insolvent. Because each
creditor has only a limited probability of being first-a probability
dependent on the number of other creditors-the expected value of
its claim, on average, is maximized if firms with a going-concern sur-
plus are kept together. 28 In contrast, the state law rule of first-come,
first-served can lead creditors to dissipate the debtor's assets in a man-
ner that runs counter to the interests of the group. 29
In addition to the possible loss of going-concern value, the race
to the debtor's assets has a second cost: the cost of the race itself.
The first-come, first-served nature of state collection law induces cred-
itors to spend money to monitor both their debtors and their fellow
creditors to ensure that they do not end up last in line should a debtor
become insolvent. While monitoring of debtor behavior may be ben-
eficial, monitoring the behavior of other creditors generally will be of
little value. Because most, if not all, creditors presumably will act sim-
ilarly, these expenditures will not ensure that the creditor wins the race,
but simply that it has a chance to participate in it. Thus, these ex-
27. See In re Federated Dep't Stores (Bankr. S.D. Ohio May 31, 1991) (LEXIS, Bankr.
library, Bankr. file, No. 743).
28. Even if there is no going-concern surplus, the creditors, to the extent they are risk
averse, would gain from forced sharing. See T.H. JACKSoN, LoGIC AND LUdrrs, supra note 9,
at 15.
29. It is unclear whether bankruptcy law preserves this surplus in an efficient manner.
Current reorganization practice insists on the current creditors, rather than third parties,
owning the firm after bankruptcy. See Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization,
15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 138-39 (1986). It also is unclear whether such a policy is justifiable.
Compare Jackson & Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing
and the Creditor's Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 164-67 (1989) with Adler, Bankruptcy and
Risk Allocation, 77 CoaREL. L. Rv. (1992) (forthcoming). The best solution may be for
firms to commit to a certain type of bankruptcy proceeding when they form. See Rasmussen,
The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEv. J. (1991) (forthcoming); Rasmussen, Debtor's
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy (Aug. 1991) (working paper).
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penditures do not make the creditors as a group any better off.30
This state of affairs raises what is known as a collective-action
problem. 31 As a group, creditors would be better off if they knew that
a firm with a positive going-concern surplus was going to remain intact
even after it became insolvent and they acted accordingly. In this way,
any going-concern surplus would be preserved for the creditors' ben-
efit, and the money that would have been spent on the race would
be saved. As the world exists outside of bankruptcy, however, each
individual creditor has an incentive to seek immediate payment of its
claim. The incentives of the individual thus run counter to the interests
of the group. Put differently, if the creditors were to agree among
themselves before their common debtor became insolvent that in the
case of insolvency they would hold off on their collection efforts, they
could increase the amount that they ultimately realize as a group.
32
Such an agreement, however, is unlikely to be consummated. First,
the identity of a debtor's creditors is constantly changing. Second,
even if all creditors recognize the fact that the debtor-business would
be worth more if kept intact, they may not be able to negotiate such
a solution. Each creditor will worry about binding all of the other
creditors to the proposed agreement. There is little reason to agree to
abstain from exercising your collection options if the other creditors
will not agree to forebear from exercising theirs. Moreover, every cred-
itor has an incentive to cheat: it can maximize its return if the other
creditors forestall their collection efforts while it seeks payment in full.
For the same reasons that cartels are notoriously unstable, 33 we would
expect few creditors to reach an agreement among themselves to re-
frain from exercising their rights under state law.
The creditors' bargain model explains bankruptcy as the bargain
that the creditors would strike to overcome this collective action prob-
lem in a world where bargaining is costless.3 4 According to the terms
30. See T.H. JACKSON, LoGIC AND Lnmrs, supra note 9, at 13; Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 9, at 861-64. This rationale must not be taken too
far. Not all insolvent firms invoke the protection of the bankruptcy laws, therefore, some
monitoring still will be necessary. However, to the extent that bankruptcy can be designed to
attract firms with positive going-concern values, the marginal costs of the race should be
reduced.
31. On collective action generally, see R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTiVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND TIM THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
32. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 9, at 866-67.
33. See R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 102-04 (1978) ("[E]ach firm will be severely
tempted to take more sales at the higher price, letting the others make the sacrifice of holding
price up by holding back on sales.").
34. T.H. JACKSON, LOGIC & LIMsTs, supra note 9, at 10-19.
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of the bargain, the variety of individual collection methods is replaced
by a collective proceeding-bankruptcy-that allows creditors to over-
come the collective action problem. Bankruptcy forces creditors into
a single forum where, as a group, they can decide the debtor's future.
Assuming it is properly structured, this collective proceeding maxi-
mizes the return to the creditors as a group. The race to the assets
of state law is replaced by reasoned decisionmaking.3 5
The creditors' bargain explanation of bankruptcy sketched so far
works equally well regardless of whether the creditor is a private or
public entity. It is not the status of the creditor that creates the col-
lective action problem; rather, it is the fact that the creditor seeks
money and knows that once the debtor becomes insolvent some cred-
itors will not have their claims satisfied in full. Though the creditors'
bargain model does not distinguish governmental creditors, this in-
attention does not detract from the argument that bankruptcy should
solve the collective action problem caused by state law.
The explanation of bankruptcy offered thus far, however, is in-
complete. It only justifies limiting creditors' collection remedies and
forcing them to decide the debtor's fate in a collective forum. It does
not, in and of itself, justify resolving disputes between the debtor and
its creditors in the collective forum. One can imagine a world where
claims against the debtor would be resolved outside of bankruptcy,
while bankruptcy would address only the ultimate disposition of the
debtor's assets. 36 For example, nonbankruptcy courts could decide
whether the debtor had breached a contract with a creditor, and if
so, what the appropriate damages should be. The bankruptcy court,
meanwhile, would prevent a creditor from collecting on the judgment
while all the creditors wrestled with the question of the proper dis-
position of the debtor's assets.
This approach, however, would have substantial costs. 37 First, it
would delay the ultimate decision of what to do with the debtor's as-
sets. The bankruptcy court would have to wait until the nonbank-
ruptcy forum had decided which parties had valid claims against the
debtor and thus should participate in deciding the debtor's fate. Sec-
ond, the debtor might have a number of disputed claims. Resolving
each claim in a different forum almost certainly would be more costly
35. Id.
36. See Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 73, 85 (1985) [hereinafter Jackson, Translating Assets] ("It would, of course, be possible
to follow nonbankruptcy procedures by deferring disposition of the debtor's assets (or their
proceeds) to any group that would share at or below the level of priority accorded the entity
with the unliquidated claim.").
37. For a description of these costs, see id. at 84-86.
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than resolving them all in a single forum. These costs could arise be-
cause different cases might involve common issues, time might be spent
learning local rules, local counsel might have to be retained, and be-
cause of other similar circumstances. Third, and perhaps most im-
portant, the creditors probably would agree amongst themselves that
truncated procedures for determining claims should be used when the
debtor becomes insolvent. Litigation outside of bankruptcy, however,
contains numerous procedures that are designed to ensure an accurate
result. These procedures simply may not be worth their cost when, in
the end, all claims will be paid off at only pennies on the dollar. For
these reasons, which can be categorized loosely as administrative ef-
ficiencies, the creditors' bargain model posits that disputed claims
should be resolved inside the collective proceeding.3 8
To date, the administrative efficiency element of the creditors'
bargain has not been examined critically. Such an examination reveals
two points. The first is that these administrative efficiencies are a col-
lateral benefit to the creation of the collective proceeding, rather than
a justification for such a proceeding in the first instance. The fact that
a single forum may be efficacious in resolving multiple disputes can-
not, in and of itself, justify the creation of the bankruptcy forum.
Firms outside of bankruptcy often will have multiple suits pending
against them at any one time. Some of these firms will be unable to
pay in full all judgments rendered against them. No one contends that
these facts require that the multiplicity of currently existing forums
be eliminated. Only after it is decided that we should have a collective
proceeding does one reach the question of what should be decided in
that proceeding.
An example illustrates the point. Many firms produced asbestos,
thereby subjecting themselves to substantial product liability claims.3 9
These tort claims, which arose under state law, have involved these
firms in litigation in a multitude of forums. Few would dispute that
it would be cheaper for these firms if all of the claims were resolved
in a single forum.4° The fact that a single proceeding would be cheaper
38. See id. It is unclear whether bankruptcy as currently practiced achieves such savings.
For an anecdotal view suggesting that it does not, see S. STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS: INSIDE
CHAPTER II-AN ExPosE passim (1989).
39. The problem of the mass tortfeasor in bankruptcy has been examined in Roe,
Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); Note, The Manville Bankruptcy:
Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1983); Note,
Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative
Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEX. L. REv. 1297 (1983) (authored
by Margaret I. Lyle).
40. In fact, the asbestos litigation outside of bankruptcy seems to be moving toward just
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does not, of itself, indicate that all these firms, regardless of their
solvency, should be in a collective bankruptcy proceeding. Once a col-
lective proceeding exists, however, significant savings may be achieved
by resolving disputed claims in the bankruptcy, rather than the non-
bankruptcy, forum.
Moreover, that there may be significant savings from resolving
disputes in the bankruptcy forum does not necessarily mean that such
savings will result in every case. In some instances, the cost of pro-
ceeding in the nonbankruptcy forum actually may be less than having
the dispute decided in the bankruptcy court. For example, the debtor
and the creditor may have nearly completed litigating the case in the
nonbankruptcy forum. If so, the cost of relitigating in the bankruptcy
forum-even using abbreviated procedures-would outweigh any sav-
ings that could be generated. There is no bankruptcy reason for not
allowing such a case to conclude in the nonbankruptcy forum. Thus,
it is not necessarily true that all disputes involving a debtor should
be resolved in the bankruptcy forum.
That it may be more efficacious to use the nonbankruptcy forum
suggests that there should be merely a presumption that disputes be-
tween a creditor and a debtor who is already in bankruptcy ought be
resolved in the bankruptcy arena. So long as creditors are restrained
from enforcing their judgments, the primary goals of bankruptcy-
ensuring the proper disposition of the debtor's assets and reducing the
costs of the race to the debtor's assets-are served. Whether a given
dispute should be resolved in bankruptcy turns on the respective costs
of the competing forums. Thus, whereas staying all nonbankruptcy
collection efforts is an integral part of the bankruptcy process, re-
solving all disputes between the debtor and its creditors in the bank-
ruptcy forum is not.
The second point that an examination of the administrative ef-
ficiency argument reveals is that the creditors' bargain conception of
bankruptcy assumes it is possible to resolve all nonbankruptcy disputes
inside of bankruptcy. One merely asks whether it is cheaper to resolve
the dispute in bankruptcy, not whether the bankruptcy court is in-
stitutionally competent to resolve it. This assumption derives from the
model's persistent focus on the relationship between the debtor and
its private creditors. With respect to such disputes, there is no reason
to believe that a bankruptcy forum is any less capable of resolving
the dispute than a nonbankruptcy forum. If both state and federal
such a consolidation. See In re Joint Eastern and Southern Districts Litigation, (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1991) (LEXIS, U.S. Dist. file No. 8956); In re Joint Eastern and Southern Districts Litigation,
132 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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courts can decide contract disputes, the assumption runs, so can bank-
ruptcy courts. The substance of the dispute is not tied to the forum
in which it is resolved.
This assumption runs aground when the creditor is the govern-
ment rather than a private party. In the next part of this Article, I
explain the explicit link in administrative law between the substantive
right at issue and the forum in which the dispute is resolved. I then
apply this learning and produce a framework for resolving the prob-
lems that arise when public law becomes enmeshed in a bankruptcy
proceeding.
II. The Policies of Administrative Law
The creditors' bargain model fails to recognize any meaningful
difference between a private party pursuing a dispute against the debtor
and the government doing so. This failure undermines any attempt
by the creditors' bargain model to explain the appropriate treatment
of the government as a creditor in bankruptcy. To correct this failing,
it is necessary first to examine the way in which the government differs
from a private creditor. This Part surveys administrative law in order
to elucidate the concerns that arise when a bankruptcy court attempts
to interfere with the relationship between the debtor and the govern-
ment.
Perhaps the most striking feature of administrative law is its gen-
eral lack of focus on the substance of agency action. Whereas tort law
examines actual torts, and constitutional law the constitution, ad-
ministrative law does not look at the substance of administrative ac-
tion. This inattentiveness to actual results is hardly surprising in an
area of law which encompasses such diverse agencies as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Rather than
focusing on the results of administrative decisionmaking, administra-
tive law examines the process by which agencies reach their results and
the deference this process should receive in the courts.41 This focus
on process is perhaps best illustrated by the name of the statutory
source for the basic principles of administrative law-the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act ("APA"). 42
41. See Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. Ray. 363, 364 (1986) ("The
central question [after the New Deal] became not when administrators could decide matters
but how they should decide matters.") (emphasis in original).
42. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988); see also Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and
the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REv. 271, 272 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Factions] ("The legislative history of the APA shows almost no sign of interest in substantive
issues of regulation.").
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The importance of process in this context derives in large part
from the rationale for the creation and continued existence of ad-
ministrative agencies. The modem regulatory state began during the
New Deal. 43 During that period of legal and economic upheaval, ad-
ministrative agencies were designed to become experts in their fields
of regulation. 44 With the advent of the industrial revolution, American
society had become increasingly complex. In this complex environ-
ment, it was thought that it no longer was possible for the generalist
legislature to implement its policy.45 Nor were the courts institutionally
equipped to deal with the complexity and velocity of change in modern
society. 4 Therefore, it was necessary to have a group of experts whose
long study of the subject to be regulated enabled them to implement
the general directives of Congress. 47
These experts were to be apolitical, career bureaucrats. 48 They
were to be implementors rather than instigators. Congress' role was
to choose between conflicting goals, often representing a battle of dif-
fering ideologies, and thus identify the purpose for which agencies
would be created.49 Once Congress had discharged this function, it
could retire from the arena and leave the expert administrators to study
the field and settle on the appropriate policies to implement their Con-
gressionally granted charter.5 0 Only if Congress set forth the g6neral
goals to be achieved could the agency bring its specific expertise to
bear on the subject matter.5 1 While agencies often made policy, these
policies were to implement the general purpose established by Con-
gress.
43. See B. AcKiumA, RECONSTRUCTING AMEmCAN LAW 6-10 (1984); Sunstein, Inierpreting
Statutes, supra note 1, at 408-10.
44. James Landis was the primary proponent of this view of administrative agencies. See
J. LANDIs, Tan A RimrIvE PROCESS 23-31, 46, 154-55 (1938).
45. See id. at 23-24 ("The advantages of specialization in the field of regulatory activity
seem obvious enough .... With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became
dominant; for the art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its
operation, ability to shift requirements as the condition of the industry may dictate, the pursuit
of energetic measures upon the appearance of an emergency, and the power through enforce-
ment to realize conclusions as to policy.").
46. See id. at 30-46.
47. See id. at 46 ("The administrative process is, in essence, our generation's answer to
the inadequacy of the judicial and legislative processes.").
48. See id. at 154.
49. See id. at 55 ("responsibility for fashioning a policy, not only of great economic
importance but also one that has divided the faiths and loyalties of classes of people, cannot
appropriately be intrusted -[sic] to the administrative [process]").
50. But see id. at 55-57 (faulting Congress, in passing the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, for turning over the "burning issue" of holding companies in the public utilities
field to the FTC rather than resolving it in the first instance).
51. See id. at 56-57 (Congress had to lay out basic guidelines "before the problem was
defined sufficiently for an administrative approach").
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This technocratic concept of the role of an administrative agency
has profound consequences for judicial review of agency action.12 The
agency is not treated as a private party bringing its grievance before
the court, which then decides the issue de novo. Rather, when an agency
is acknowledged to be an expert in the field it regulates, the courts
essentially admit that the agency is better positioned to make some
judgments than the generalist court. For example, a court may be ill-
equipped to second-guess the technical judgment of an agency. 3
Therefore, when an agency has been charged with administrative fact-
finding in its area of expertise, a court should uphold its findings so
long as they find some support in the record . 4 A rule promulgated
under the agency's rulemaking authority also should receive minimum
scrutiny, since the agency is much better able to determine whether
the policy embodied in the rule promotes the congressional goal than
is the generalist court. 5
These notions of agency expertise heavily influenced the standards
of review set forth in the APA. Although the APA was enacted shortly
after the end of the New Deal, it traces its roots back to that period.16
The APA mandates that courts respect agency fact findings that are
supported by substantial evidence. 7 It also requires that courts defer
to agency decisions so long as they are not arbitrary, capricious, abuses
of discretion, or contrary to law.58 While the APA is by no means the
52. See id. at 143-44 ("If the extent of judicial review is being shaped, as I believe, by
reference to an appreciation of the qualities of expertness for decision that the administrator
may possess, important consequences follow."); Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the
Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1041, 1057 (1975) ("The premise that administrative
agencies have a substantive expertise in their areas of regulatory responsibility was accepted
by the courts and has become the basis of a considerable body of administrative law, particularly
in the areas of primary jurisdiction and the scope of judicial review.'").
53. See Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) ("U]udges are not experts
in the field"); Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (when agency
"is making predictions, within its area of expertise, at the frontiers of science ... [judicial
review] must generally be . . . 'most deferential'); Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of
Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 388 (judges may be unlikely "to sympathetically
understand the problems the agency faces in setting technical standards in complex areas").
54. See J. LANDIS, supra note 44, at 142 ("The positive reason for declining judicial
review over administrative findings of fact is the belief that the expertness of the administrative,
if guarded by adequate procedures, can be trusted to determine these issues as capably as
judges."); Winter, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court,
1968 Sup. CT. REv. 53, 62 ("The argument based on the need for an expert adjudicator with
adequate experience and information is a strong one.").
55. See J. LANDIS, supra note 44, at 147-48.
56. See generally Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA.
L. REv. 219, 224-26 (1986).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
58. Id.
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last word on the scope of judicial review, 9 it engenders a deferential
mood when it comes to judicial review of agency decisions.
The model of the agency as a neutral expert has come under heavy
attack in the past twenty-five years. These attacks center on two areas.
The first attack posits that agencies are not neutral because they are
unduly influenced by certain types of interest groups.6 Specifically,
groups affected by the regulation at issue that are sufficiently con-
centrated have inordinate input compared to more diffuse groups. This
influence may become so pervasive that the agency is said to be "cap-
tured" by the groups it is charged with regulating. This critique sug-
gests that vigorous judicial review of agency procedures is necessary. 61
It does not, however, counsel abandoning notions of judicial deference
to agency expertise.6 Rather, it posits that there are reasons why agen-
cies may not exercise their expertise and that, accordingly, courts should
defer only if satisfied that the agency has considered all relevant fac-
tors and brought its expertise to bear on the problem.
The second attack on the New Deal conception of the admin-
istrative agency is more fundamental. Rather than challenging the im-
plementation of the "expert" model of agency action, it argues that
the model does not reflect reality. This critique denies that it is possible
for a neutral expert to implement the will of Conigress. This inability
arises from the fact that, in the modern regulatory state, Congress does
not make basic policy decisions and leave their implementation to ad-
ministrative agencies. Instead, it often simply identifies the relevant,
and usually competing, policies for the agency to consider. 63 Selection
59. See Breger, The APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REv.
337, 353-55 (1986) (although codified in statute, these provisions retained the plasticity of
judge-made law, and as a result, it is not surprising that after forty years their accepted
meaning differs from the 1946 understanding).
60. See Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach,
88 YALE L.J. 243, 248-50 (1978); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HAv. L. REv. 1193, 1226-27 (1982); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1684-87 (1975).
61. For example, courts should: take a "hard look" to ensure that agencies have considered
only appropriate factors, Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT.
R-v. 177, 181-84; allow statutory beneficiaries to challenge regulatory activities, Stewart &
Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1202-20; and graft new procedures onto the APA to ensure that
administrative agencies engage in a "genuine dialogue" on the issues, NRDC v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
62. For an attack on the notion that agencies possess an expertise which gives them
institutional advantages over courts, see Gillette & Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U.
PA. L. Rnv. 1027, 1088-89 (1990).
63. See Pierce, The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Govern-
ment, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1244-50 (1989); Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Adminis-
trative State, 89 CoLum. L. RE. 369, 380-85 (1989).
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among these competing policies thus devolves upon the agency. Thus,
it is naive to posit, as the New Dealers did, that agencies simply choose
the appropriate means to implement Congress' command. According
to this view, administrative agencies are making the very policy choices
their New Deal defenders thought should be made by Congress. 64
Strangely enough, this second attack on the New Deal view of
the agency has not led to a decrease in judicial deference to agency
decisionmaking. Instead, it has changed the conception of the agency,
and, in so doing, led to increased judicial deference. To be sure, the
agency is still acknowledged to have expertise, 65 but the conception of
the agency has changed from that of an expert technocrat imple-
menting congressionally selected goals to that of a reasoned deci-
sionmaker selecting among competing goals. 6 Now the justification
for deferring to agency decisions stems in large part from notions of
political accountability: the agency decisionmaker is accountable to the
President, who is in turn accountable to the people. While this link
is somewhat attenuated, it is stronger than that between the judiciary
and the people. According to this view, when Congress has left room
for policy judgments, courts should acknowledge the agency as the
more legitimate body to make those judgments. 67
Perhaps the most dramatic shift in the conception of the agency
has been in the treatment of an agency's interpretation of the laws
that it has been charged with implementing. Under the expertise model,
the deference given to the agency's interpretation turns on a number
of factors related to whether the agency's expertise adds anything to
the question at hand. 68 Courts have found, for example, that deference
to an agency interpretation is warranted where the interpretation has
been reexamined and affirmed on repeated occasions.6 9 In contrast,
64. See Stewart, Reformation of Administrative Law, supra note 60, at 1681-84.
65. See, e.g., Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534-35 (1991); Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767-69 (1991); Martin v. Occupation, Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1176-77 (1991); Board of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment
Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56-57 n.21 (1980) (citing Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,
450 (1947)).
66. See Sunstein, Factions, supra note 42, at 281-92.
67. See Pierce, supra note 63, at 1254; Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law &
Policy, 58 Gao. WAsH. L. Rv. 821, 823 (1990).
68. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (noting that deference is due to
contemporaneous construction of a statute by those who are experts in the area); see also
Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REv.
915, 985-86 (1988) (it is appropriate and does not violate article III for courts to defer to
administrative interpretations in the area of the agency's expertise).
69. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978); Chemehuevi
Tribe v. Federal Power Comm'n, 420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974).
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the Supreme Court has used the decisionmaker model to accord sub-
stantial deference to all administrative interpretations, regardless of
the extent to which they draw on agency expertise.
The lead case reflecting this shift is Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.70 In Chevron, the Supreme Court faced
a challenge to the validity of the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") interpretation of the word "stationary source" in an en-
vironmental statute.71 Under the Carter administration, the EPA had
adopted one interpretation of this statutory term; under the then newly
elected Reagan administration, it had adopted another. 724In passing
on the challenge to the new interpretation, the Court set forth a two-
step test for assessing the validity of the EPA's, or any agency's, in-
terpretation.- First, the interpretation will not be followed if Congress
"addressed the precise question at issue," and the agency failed to
heed the will of Congress.74 Second, if Congress did not address the
matter, the court must respect the agency's interpretation so long as
it is reasonable. 75 In other words, if the statute reasonably could be
interpreted in more than one way, the agency, rather than the court,
selects the appropriate interpretation.
While the Court did mention agency expertise as justifying this
deferential standard,76 the driving force behind its adoption of this
broad deference is the notion of political accountability:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch
of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the com-
peting interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not re-
solve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with
the administration of the statute .... 77
The agency's relatively close ties to the electorate thus justifies the
agency's making the necessary policy choices involved in interpreting
an ambiguous statute.7
70. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
71. Id. at 840.
72. Id. at 857-859.
73. Id. at 842-43.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 843.
76. Id. at 865; see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2668,
2679 (1990) ("This practical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind
Chevron deference.").
77. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
78. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Chevron doctrine is the discontinuity it
creates between executive and judicial interpretative practices. Once a statute is found to be
ambiguous, the executive agency is free to choose between the competing interpretations based
on what it conceives to be good policy. Indeed, this is the type of interpretative practice
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A central principle of modern administrative law, then, is that
determination of certain issues is left in the first instance to admin-
istrative agencies, subject to deferential, though meaningful, review
by the courts. From this it follows that when administrative agencies
rather than private creditors are involved, one cannot separate sub-
stantive rights from the forum in which those rights are decided. There
often are a number of alternatives available to an agency in any given
situation, whether it involves a finding of fact, an interpretation of
law, or the implementation of policy. The expertise and the deci-
sionmaker models of agency both require that the responsibility for
choosing among alternatives be left to the agency.
This responsibility has profound consequences for integrating the
administrative state into bankruptcy theory. As shown above, the cred-
itors' bargain model assumes that bankruptcy courts are institutionally
capable of resolving all disputes involving the debtor. But one of the
central tenets of administrative law is that the agency, rather than the
court, must make a decision in the first instance. Bankruptcy courts
thus cannot simply resolve a dispute between the debtor and the gov-
ernment that under nonbankruptcy law would be resolved first by the
agency. The easy translation of nonbankruptcy entitlements into the
bankruptcy forum assumed by the creditors' bargain model simply
does not exist in the administrative context. In the next Part, I take
account of this difficulty and integrate the administrative state into
bankruptcy theory.
111. Integrating the Government into Bankruptcy Theory
With the normative underpinnings of bankruptcy and adminis-
trative law firmly in place, I now explicate the appropriate relationship
between these two bodies of law. 79 At the outset, it is helpful to note
realists once urged courts to undertake. See, e.g., Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer
Jurisprudence, 40 CoLuM. L. REv. 581 (1940). While administrative agencies currently follow
this prescription, the Supreme Court now engages in highly formalistic reasoning in interpreting
a statute to create a definite answer where none exists. For an example of such reasoning in
the bankruptcy context, see Justice Scalia's opinion for a unanimous Court in United Savings
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'n, 484 U.S. 365 (1988). For an analysis of this trend,
see Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" Legal Process, 12 CnRDozo L. REv. 1597,
1614-20 (1991).
79. The analysis that follows differs dramatically from that offered by Professor Theodore
Eisenberg. Professor Eisenberg focuses on the problem of access to the administrators, see
supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text, and asks whether the bankruptcy process can
alleviate this problem. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 22-28. This problem of agency bias,
however, is not a bankruptcy problem, but one of administrative law. Nonbankruptcy courts
have wrestled with this problem, and there is no reason to believe that the purposes of
bankruptcy-solving the collective action problem and reducing strategic costs-provide any
insight into the proper solution of agency bias.
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that a governmental entity can pursue a debtor for liabilities arising
from conduct that the debtor engaged in during one of three discrete
time periods: before the filing of the bankruptcy petition; after the
bankruptcy filing but before the end of the bankruptcy proceeding;
and after the completion of the bankruptcy proceeding. In this Part
of the Article, I first examine the polar cases of post-bankruptcy and
pre-bankruptcy actions, and then conclude with the intermediate case
of action taken during the bankruptcy process itself. In assessing the
appropriate bankruptcy law response to government action in each of
these periods, each section begins by examining the usual situation-
the proper treatment of a private creditor-and then determines the
extent to which the unique nature of the governmental claim requires
a change in analysis. Each section then compares this normative
framework both to the actual language of the Bankruptcy Code and
to court decisions interpreting this language.
In examining the relationship between bankruptcy and the ad-
ministrative state, two questions should be kept separate. The first is
the extent to which bankruptcy should relieve a debtor from complying
with nonbankruptcy law. The second is in which forum the dispute
between the debtor and government should be resolved. These ques-
tions clearly are distinct and should remain so. The reason for asking
the first question flows from the primary justifications for bank-
ruptcy-preventing a destructive race to the debtor's assets and re-
ducing monitoring costs. The creditors' bargain model of bankruptcy
adequately addresses this question. It identifies the goals of the col-
lective proceeding and posits that bankruptcy should change non-
bankruptcy law only to the extent necessary to achieve these purposes. 0
Bankruptcy law by its nature changes certain nonbankruptcy law
rules. For example, secured creditors are stayed from foreclosing on
their collateral and thereby removing the assets from the debtor's op-
erations. Changes such as this create the risk that a party (either a
debtor or a creditor) will file for bankruptcy solely to take advantage
of the change in rules. In other words, parties will engage in forum
shopping. The more rules that are changed, and the more profound
the changes, the greater the incentive to do so. 8 Therefore, the rules
that bankruptcy law can change should be limited. When such changes
80. See T.H. JACKSON, Looic A Lirrs, supra note 9, at 21-27; Baird, Loss Distribution,
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 815, 816-22
(1987).
81. Forum shopping has been almost universally condemned. See, e.g., Baird, supra note
80, at 824-28; Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CoRNELL L. REv. 634,
641 (1974). For an argument that forum shopping may be unobjectionable under certain
circumstances, see Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 Hav. L. REv. 1677 (1990).
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promote the goals of the collective proceeding-proper disposition of
the debtor's assets, reduction of strategic costs, and reduction of ad-
ministrative expenses-they should be allowed. When such changes do
not promote these goals, they should not. 2
This preference for nonbankruptcy law does not mean that that
law is perfect. One legitimately can question whether a debtor's in-
voluntary creditors, such as tort claimants, should be treated the same
as the debtor's voluntary unsecured creditors, such as its trade cred-
itors. 83 This concern, however, is not a bankruptcy issue. Improving
the position of tort claimants relative to other unsecured creditors in
bankruptcy would create an incentive for those benefitting from such
a change to force an insolvent debtor into bankruptcy's federal forum.
To be sure, some may argue that the incentive provided by any single
rule change is minimal, but this response misses the point. If we al-
ready have one set of priority rules, those wishing to change those rules
in bankruptcy must explain not only why they should be changed in
bankruptcy, but also why they should not be changed outside of bank-
ruptcy. 84
While the creditors' bargain model adequately identifies the extent
to which nonbankruptcy law should be changed in bankruptcy, it fails
to resolve satisfactorily the second question: which forum should re-
solve the dispute between the debtor and the government. This ques-
tion, which generally is more difficult than deciding whether
nonbankruptcy law should be altered, derives from the rationale for
forcing private creditor disputes into the collective proceeding. As we
saw in Part I, it is the administrative efficiencies of reducing delay,
reducing the number of forums, and reducing the costs of resolving
disputes that justify resolving disputed claims inside the bankruptcy
82. For an application of this analysis to the problem of how to treat retiree medical
benefits in bankruptcy, see Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance
Benefits in Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. Rav. 161 (1990).
83. For a suggestion along these lines, see Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured
Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1045, 1079-80 (1984)
(authored by Christopher M.E. Painter).
84. Using nonbankruptcy law entitlements as the baseline for bankruptcy entitlements is
hardly controversial. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
351-352 (1985) (corporation's attorney-client privilege controlled by actor whose role approxi-
mates that of management outside of bankruptcy); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 286 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he classification of Ohio's interest as either a lien on the
property itself, a perfected security interest, or merely an unsecured claim depends on Ohio
law."); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. Rev. 1013, 1035 (1953) ("apparent
purpose" of federal bankruptcy laws is to provide a system for the effectuation of state-
created rights); Comment, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by the Trustee in Bankruptcy,
51 U. Ciu. L. REv. 1230 (1984) (authored by William R. Mitchelson, Jr.) (anticipating
Weintraub analysis).
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forum. Here, the unique nature of the government dramatically alters
the calculus of whether disputes with the debtor should be resolved
inside or outside of bankruptcy. 5 The remainder of this Article ex-
amines the three times during which a claim involving the government
can arise and integrates normative underpinnings of the administrative
state into bankruptcy theory. In doing so, it contrasts that treatment
with the treatment provided a private creditor.
A. Postbankruptcy Actions
In this section, I resolve, at a theoretical level, the proper interface
between bankruptcy and administrative law when the action at issue
occurs after the bankruptcy case has been concluded. I then measure
extant law against this normative framework.
(1) Bankruptcy Theory
The easiest case to analyze is one in which the debtor has com-
pleted the bankruptcy process.8 6 It is clear that any disputes that arise
between the reorganized firm and a postbankruptcy creditor should
be resolved in the applicable nonbankruptcy forum. Once the debtor
emerges from a Chapter 11 proceeding under a plan of reorganiza-
tion,8 7 bankruptcy presumably has fulfilled its purpose. The bank-
ruptcy proceeding has rearranged the capital structure of a firm, which
should be kept intact. To be sure, the reorganized entity might find
it advantageous to use the bankruptcy forum for future dispute res-
olution. But there is no longer a collective action problem justifying
the use of the bankruptcy forum in the first instance. After the need
for such a forum is removed, the fact that it might be efficacious in
resolving disputes is of no moment.
85. Congress has recognized that in some instances the benefits of having disputes decided
in a single forum are outweighed by other interests. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1988) (allowing
district courts to exercise discretion in deciding whether to abstain from deciding Title 11
questions in the interests of justice, comity with state courts, or respect for state law); Id. §
1334(c)(2) (requiring district courts to abstain in one type of case). For a general explanation
of the abstention doctrine as it has developed outside of bankruptcy, see Friedman, A
Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 McH. L. REv. 530 (1989).
86. Of course, not all debtors emerge from bankruptcy. Many have their assets liquidated
under Chapter 7 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988). The analysis in the text applies
with equal force to the issue of whether the buyer of a debtor's assets in a Chapter 7 liquidation
should be treated differently than a party who bought such assets outside of bankruptcy.
87. It is conceivable that an ongoing firm could emerge from a Chapter 7 liquidation as
well. See Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. LEGAL SUD. 127
(1986).
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There is no reason to alter this conclusion when the focus shifts
from the private creditor to a governmental entity. Regardless of the
identity of the creditor, once the debtor emerges from bankruptcy,
bankruptcy's purpose has been fulfilled. The owners of the debtor-
firm have agreed to continue the business and have reorganized the
firm's capital structure. There is nothing in the collective action prob-
lem which suggests that this debtor should be able to retreat to the
bankruptcy forum after the reorganization effort is complete.
(2) The Code and Case Law
By and large, the Bankruptcy Code as written comports with this
limitation on the right to return to the bankruptcy forum. Section
350(a) provides that the bankruptcy court shall end the bankruptcy
case once the "estate is fully administered and the court has discharged
the trustee.''88 Thus, once the bankruptcy purpose of deciding the
proper disposition of the debtor's assets is complete, the bankruptcy
court's involvement in the affairs of the debtor ceases.
To be sure, Section 350(b) allows a bankruptcy court to reopen
a closed case in order "to administer assets, to accord relief to the
debtor, or for other cause." 8 9 To the extent that this provision is read
simply to allow the bankruptcy court to correct oversights that it may
have made in administering the estate or to allow the court to interpret
a disputed portion of the plan of reorganization, it is unobjectionable.
Indeed, when viewed in this way it is analogous to Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil ProcedureP ° Both provisions allow a court to
revisit settled litigation in order to address an issue which should have
been addressed in that litigation.
One could argue that the "for other cause" language of Section
350(b) allows the court to reopen the case for any reason, including
the resolution of a postpetition dispute between the debtor and a new
creditor. This argument has little appeal, however. Open-ended pro-
visions in the Code should be read as supplements to the Code's more
detailed provisions, not as invitations for courts to set the world aright. 91
88. 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) (1988).
89. Id. § 350(b).
90. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 60(b) (allowing relief from final judgment for mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, excusable neglect, new evidence, satisfaction, or "any other reason justifying
relief").
91. See In re Chicago, Milw., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Bankruptcy Code "does not give the judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in
accordance with his personal views of justice and fairness"); Boston & Maine Corp. v. Chicago
Pac. Corp., 785 F.2d 562, 566 (7th Cir. 1986) (court's discretion does not allow it to use its
view of equity to expand the reach of the Bankruptcy Code).
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There is no indication that by providing flexibility in Section 350(b)
Congress intended to allow bankruptcy courts to move beyond the
paradigmatic reopening case.
To date, the courts have read Section 350(b) consonant with this
limitation. The cases invoking the statute's "for cause" language con-
sistently involve disputes that should have been addressed in the orig-
inal proceeding. 92 Both the Code and the case law thus adhere to the
theoretical conclusion that bankruptcy does not provide a forum for
resolving postbankruptcy disputes.
B. Prepetition
Most of the disputes in bankruptcy arise from the debtor's con-
duct before the bankruptcy filing. In this section, I explore the prob-
lems which arise between the debtor and the government based on the
debtor's prepetition actions. As in the preceding section, I first ex-
plicate the proper theoretical response to these problems and then can-
vass extant law.
(1) Bankruptcy Theory
As previously noted, the filing of a bankruptcy petition should
not change the substantive law that defines whether a creditor has a
claim against the debtor.93 The more difficult question relates to choos-
ing the proper forum in which to resolve the dispute between the cred-
itor and the debtor. The creditors' bargain model suggests that, as a
general matter, disputes between the debtor and its private creditors
should be resolved in the bankruptcy forum.94 As previously dis-
cussed, 95 although this result does not flow directly from the collective
action problem justifying the creation of bankruptcy, it creates certain
administrative savings over resolving the disputes in the nonbank-
ruptcy forum. These savings consist of avoiding undue delay, resolving
all disputes in a single forum, and using abbreviated procedures to
determine claims. 96
92. See, e.g., In re Frontier Enter., Inc., 70 Bankr. 356 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987) (court
reopened case to correct an obvious error in the distribution of the proceeds of the estate);
In re Mesta Mach. Co., 67 Bankr. 147 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985) (court reopened case to
provide for an accounting of funds given to a creditors' committee for its work in the
bankruptcy proceeding).
93. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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However, the cost-savings rule that prepetition disputes generally
be resolved in the bankruptcy forum does not require that all pre-
petition disputes between a debtor and a private creditor necessarily
be resolved there. One readily can imagine situations in which ad-
ministrative savings will not obtain. For example, consider the case
of a debtor who is one defendant in a suit involving multiple parties,
and the suit is nearing completion in the nonbankruptcy forum. The
gains created by resolving the dispute with the debtor in the bank-
ruptcy forum may be offset by forcing the creditor to undertake du-
plicative litigation. To be sure, the debtor may expend less money; but
the creditor now will face two proceedings-one inside of bankruptcy
against the debtor, and one outside of bankruptcy against the re-
maining nonbankruptcy defendants. Moreover, given that the non-
bankruptcy suit is nearly complete, it may be cheaper to let it reach
its conclusion before beginning even the truncated bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Stated differently, the sunk costs of the nonbankruptcy pro-
ceeding may exceed the savings generated by using the bankruptcy
forum.
Thus, in the case of the private creditor there should be a pre-
sumption-not an absolute rule-that such disputes will be resolved
in the bankruptcy forum. The only justification for the bankruptcy
court deferring to nonbankruptcy proceedings is that the nonbank-
ruptcy proceeding has advanced so far that it would be cheaper for
all involved to let the nonbankruptcy forum resolve the issue. The
creditors' bargain model, with its relentless focus on the private cred-
itor relationship, thus suggests a simple baseline: disputes involving
the prepetition conduct of the debtor should be resolved inside of
bankruptcy. 97 Only a showing that the nonbankruptcy forum is more
efficacious justifies deviating from this baseline.
The situation is not so simple, however, when it is the government
pursuing the debtor based on the debtor's prepetition conduct. In this
case, it is necessary to draw on the insights of administrative law to
determine the proper approach. Oftentimes, government action begins
in the administrative arena. For example, where a debtor is charged
with committing unfair labor practices prior to filing for bankruptcy,
the complaint first is heard by the NLRB.98 Similarly, a person who
believes he has been illegally discriminated against must file an ad-
ministrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
97. See T.H. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 9, at 44-46. While Professor Jackson
recognizes the reasons for resolving disputed claims in bankruptcy, he fails to recognize that
such a resolution should be a presumption rather than an invariable rule.
98. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
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mission as a prerequisite to bringing suit under Title VII. 99
A situation in which the initial forum is an administrative one,
differs fundamentally from one involving a private creditor. Recall
that there is a crucial distinction between forcing all collection efforts
into bankruptcy's collective proceeding, and resolving all disputes in-
volving the debtor in such a proceeding. While the first of these ap-
proaches partakes of the justification for bankruptcy, the second
follows only after it is decided such a proceeding is warranted. In forc-
ing the private creditor to resolve its dispute in the bankruptcy forum,
the implicit assumption is that the bankruptcy court can resolve the
dispute competently. Of course, there are no guarantees that the bank-
ruptcy court will decide every nonbankruptcy dispute that comes be-
fore it correctly. Yet, so long as the court is not biased in its errors,
the gains made by having the dispute resolved in bankruptcy presum-
ably will exceed the cost of any errors it might make.10 In other words,
the nonbankruptcy dispute easily can be transferred to the bankruptcy
proceeding.
This is not the case with the administrative proceeding. Replacing
an administrative proceeding with a bankruptcy proceeding is not the
same as replacing one judge with another. The lack of transferability
flows from the normative justification for administrative agencies. The
modern conception of agencies is that they are superior to courts be-
cause of their expertise and political accountability. 01 Transferring the
dispute from the administrative forum to the bankruptcy arena results
in a loss of the agency's expertise. The agency is better positioned to
decide the facts and apply the law in the first place than is the non-
expert bankruptcy court. If we were to consider only the loss in ex-
pertise, the choice between allowing the dispute to continue in the
administrative arena and forcing it into the bankruptcy forum would
require a careful weighing of the cost of the loss of expertise against
the gain of expedience. 1 2 This calculation is similar to the one that
a bankruptcy court makes in the case of a private creditor when it
decides whether to replace the nonbankruptcy forum's procedures with
those of the bankruptcy court. The less technical the problem at issue,
the more likely it would be decided by the bankruptcy court rather
than the agency.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
798 (1973) (filing administrative claim is prerequisite to suit).
100. See T.H. JACKSON, Loic AND LIMTs, supra note 9, at 44-46.
101. See supra notes 43-69 and accompanying text.
102. To the extent that the administrative agency is more efficient at resolving disputes
than the courts are, this potential gain will be reduced.
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Such a weighing process, however, would fail to account for the
loss of the agency's greater political accountability. Because of this
accountability, courts routinely defer to the agency's policy judgment
where Congress has delegated that determination to the agency. When
this factor is added to the analysis, it becomes clear that the bank-
ruptcy court (or any court for that matter) cannot be treated as a sub-
stitute for an administrative agency. The bankruptcy court simply is
not equipped to replicate the agency's ability to weigh competing pol-
icy concerns. Having the court engage in such a process would ignore
the basic justification for agencies.
This problem is, perhaps, best illustrated by the NLRB, 03 an
agency whose actions frequently intersect with the bankruptcy proc-
ess.1'4 The NLRB is one of the few federal agencies that makes policy
through adjudication rather than rulemaking. 105 Often such adjudi-
cation involves the application of a very general statute to a new sit-
uation. Under Chevron, it is up to the NLRB to weigh the competing
concerns of labor and management and reach an appropriate solution.
In this situation, it is impossible to imagine that nonbankruptcy rights
will be respected inside a bankruptcy proceeding. The substance of the
nonbankruptcy law cannot be divorced from the forum in which the
initial determination of rights is made, and thus transfer to the bank-
ruptcy forum would necessarily involve a change in the substance of
the law at issue.
Once the cost of transferring the dispute from the administrative
arena to the bankruptcy forum is understood, it becomes apparent that
the benefits ordinarily gained from resolving disputes in bankruptcy
pale in comparison. It is true that deferring to an administrative pro-
ceeding may force a debtor to litigate in more than one forum. How-
ever, the savings of proceeding in a single forum as opposed to a
103. The general principles of deference to administrative agencies discussed in Part II are
applied to the NLRB in Winter, supra note 54.
104. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 521-34 (1984) (treatment of
collective bargaining agreements under Bankruptcy Code); NLRB v. Better Bldg. Supply Corp.,
837 F.2d 377, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1988) (NLRB damage award survived Chapter 7 proceeding);
In re Ionospshere Clubs, Inc., 114 Bankr. 379, 389-402 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (finding actions to
enforce collective bargaining not automatically stayed under § 362), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 922 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1990).
105. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974). The NLRB's reluctance
to engage in substantive rulemaking has been widely criticized. See NLRB v. Majestic Weaving
Co., 355 F.2d 854, 859-61 (2d Cir. 1966) (opinion by Friendly, J.); Peck, A Critique of the
National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-
Making, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 254, 260 (1968). The NLRB recently has begun to make use of
its rulemaking power in certain circumstances. See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899
F.2d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1990) (NLRB rule recognizing eight separate bargaining units in the
acute-care hospital industry).
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6ultiplicity of forums is proportionate to the number of additional
forms and, accordingly, the cost of just one additional forum should
be minimal. Moreover, the advantages of truncated bankruptcy pro-
ceedings do not loom large in comparison to those of agency pro-
ceedings. Many agencies already have streamlined proceedings. 16
Finally, it is unlikely that deference to the administrative forum would
unduly delay the completion of the bankruptcy proceeding. There is
no reason to believe that the bankruptcy proceeding generally would
conclude before the administrative one. Though it is likely that in the
case of private creditors pursuing a number of suits, the resolution
of some of these disputes by nonbankruptcy means would take longer
than the bankruptcy proceeding, this would not appear to be true where
there is only one other proceeding at issue. With only two relevant
proceedings, it often will be the case that the administrative proceeding
will end before the bankruptcy proceeding does. Moreover, given that
the number of nonbankruptcy proceedings presumably would be few,
the bankruptcy court easily could take them into account through such
means as contingent treatment of the dispute.:°
In sum, explicit consideration of the administrative state with re-
spect to bankruptcy theory leads to a result radically different than
that generated by the creditors' bargain model. In situations where a
court reviewing agency action would have to defer to the judgment
of the agency, the filing of a bankruptcy petition should not preclude
the agency from proceeding against the debtor. 108 The administrative
arena should resolve the dispute unimpeded by the bankruptcy proc-
ess. 109
106. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 6.15-6.19 (1990) (procedure for ensuring compliance with wage
standards in federal contracts).
107. Contingent treatment is provided for by § 502(c). See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988).
Under this provision, the court estimates the claim at issue and allows the nonbankruptcy
forum to adjudicate it. See, e.g., Bittner v. Borne Chemical, 691 F.2d 134, 135-36 (3d Cir.
1982).
108. This conclusion applies with even greater force to those rare instances in which
Congress has precluded judicial review of agency decisions. For examples of such preclusions,
see Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 669-77 (1960) (decisions of Director of Office of Alien
Property, with respect to returning property acquired by the United States during wartime);
Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 178-82 (1925) (discretionary decisions of
Secretary of the Interior to allow claims against the United States for losses incurred by private
parties in support of war effort). In these situations, Congress has concluded that courts
should play no role, and it is hard to imagine that any bankruptcy policy should override this
congressional judgment.
109. This analysis applies with full force to the problem of arbitration in bankruptcy.
Unions or individual employees often seek to enforce arbitration clauses contained in collective
bargaining agreements. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 114 Bankr. at 379, 379 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 922 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Midwest Emery
Up to this point, the analysis has focused on the situation in which
the nonbankruptcy forum is an administrative forum. Government
agencies, however, often pursue debtors in judicial forums as well.
Once the focus shifts to this situation, the appropriate forum shifts
as well. The reasons for not transferring the dispute into the bank-
ruptcy forum evaporate. No longer is the bankruptcy court hamstrung
by its lack of expertise or political accountability. There is no reason
to believe that a bankruptcy court competent to apply nonbankruptcy
law, such as contracts or constitutional law, could not ascertain and
apply the basic concepts of administrative law as competently as any
other court.
The proper treatment of disputes involving the government thus
differs from that proposed by the creditors' bargain model. All pre-
bankruptcy disputes should not be forced into the bankruptcy forum.
Those disputes which, under nonbankruptcy law would have to be
resolved in the first instance in an administrative forum-to which a
reviewing court would have to give deference-should be resolved in
such forums even though one of the parties has filed for bankruptcy.
When a government agency proceeds in an ordinary, judicial non-
bankruptcy forum, however, the dispute properly may be transferred
to a bankruptcy forum.
Before measuring current law against this theory, one final area
involving the government pursuit of a debtor merits discussion-the
problem that arises when the government pursues a criminal prose-
cution against the debtor based on the debtor's prepetition conduct.
When the government pursues an individual, there is a sharp practical
distinction depending on whether the purported violation is civil or
criminal. If it is criminal, the individual faces the possibility of in-
carceration. Because of this possibility, criminal cases against indi-
vidual debtors should not be resolved in bankruptcy court.
Bankruptcy's truncated procedures inevitably produce a variation in
results from those produced by the more robust procedures commonly
employed outside of bankruptcy. While such variations are acceptable
when a court is resolving monetary claims, they are not acceptable
where an erroneous decision could deprive a person of liberty.110 The
Freight Sys., 48 Bankr. 566, 569 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Smith Jones, Inc., 17 Bankr.
126, 127 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981). Courts generally recognize that they are not institutionally
capable of replicating the arbitration process. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 1546, 1555 (lth Cir. 1988). For the same reason, these disputes should
be resolved through arbitration rather than in the bankruptcy forum.
110. Few principles are more deeply ingrained in our law than Blackstone's comment that,
in the criminal context, "the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than
that one innocent suffer." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMNTARIES *353.
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corporate context does not implicate the same concerns. The govern-
ment cannot jail a corporation. When the government pursues a cor-
poration criminally, it seeks money. It therefore makes little sense not
to resolve criminal proceedings against the corporation in the bank-
ruptcy forum.
One might argue that this analysis overlooks an important point.
Bankruptcy's truncated procedures are justified on the ground that,
as long as any errors resulting from the lack of procedural protections
are random, creditors as a group are better off trading these proce-
dures for the elaborate ones that exist outside of bankruptcy. The cred-
itors, however, may not wish tojmake this trade in the criminal context.
A criminal conviction can have a stigmatizing effect on a business.
Most people attach a value to abiding by the law, and many may sim-
ply decide not to do business with a known criminal. It may be that
creditors would be better off employing the elaborate procedures than
running the risk of improper stigmatization. To the extent the errors
are random, however, creditors would benefit in those cases where the
debtor would have been convicted had more elaborate procedures been
used."' It follows that claims against the debtor based on alleged crim-
inal law violations should not be treated differently than claims based
on civil law violations.
(2) The Code and Case Law
The Code's treatment of the debtor's prepetition conduct, as a
general matter, comports with the preceding analysis. The mechanism
the Code uses for channelling claims based on the prepetition conduct
of the debtor into the bankruptcy forum is the automatic stay pro-
vision of section 362.112 Section 362(a)(1) deprives creditors of their
various means of obtaining money from the debtor. It provides for
a stay of "the commencement or continuation ... of a judicial, ad-
ministrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was
or could have been commenced before the [filing of a bankruptcy pe-
tition].""13 It also bars any attempt to obtain property of the estate,
or to collect on a debt which arose prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
111. As a practical matter, there may be constitutional limitations on the use of truncated
procedures in the criminal context even when the defendant is a corporation. See Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1970) (seventh amendment right to jury extends to corpora-
tions); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889) (corporation is a "person"
for purposes of fourteenth amendment).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
113. Id. § 362(a)(1).
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petition.11 4 This stay applies equally to governmental entities, regard-
less of whether they are considered "creditors" under the Code." 5
The automatic stay, however, is neither monolithic nor absolute.
Section 362(b) carves out certain exceptions from the broad brush of
section 362(a). Two of these exceptions explicitly pertain to the gov-
ernment. One, the "(b)(1)" exception, excepts from the stay all crim-
inal proceedings against the debtor."16 The second, the so-called "(b)(4)"
exception, is the most litigated of all the stay exceptions. Section
362(b)(4) provides that the automatic stay does not reach "the com-
mencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a govern-
mental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power."'117 This exception extends only to the initiation and completion
of judicial or administrative proceedings; it does not extend to the
enforcement of a money judgment arising out of such proceedings." I8
The justification for this limitation to the (b)(4) exception is read-
ily apparent. Once the government's dispute with the debtor has been
reduced to an order that the debtor pay money, the government is no
different than a private creditor. Neither the agency's expertise nor
its political accountability is relevant. It simply wants to receive pay-
ment from the debtor. The creditors' bargain model rightly suggests
that no party should be able to collect on a judgment during a col-
lective proceeding. To allow one party to do so, while staying the en-
forcement of all other judgments, would be tantamount to giving the
unstayed party a priority that it does not enjoy outside of bank-
ruptcy. '9
Before analyzing the (b)(4) and (b)(1) exceptions, it is necessary
to note the precise effect of an automatic stay. Sections 362(a) and
(b) do not set absolute limits on creditor collection efforts; rather, they
establish a baseline regarding which actions are to be stayed and which
are not. With respect to those actions that are stayed, section 362(d)
allows the bankruptcy court to lift the stay for "cause.' ' 20
114. Id. § 362(a)(6). For the timing of when a claim arises under section 362(a), see
Jackson, Translating Assets, supra note 36. at 82-83.
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988); id. § 101(14) (defining "entity").
116. Id. § 362(b)(1).
117. Id. § 362(b)(4).
118. Id. § 362(b)(5).
119. Congress recognized this point when it enacted § 362(b)(5). See S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 5838 ("Since the
assets of the debtor are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy court, and since they
constitute a fund out of which all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a governmental
unit of a money judgment would give it preferential treatment to the detriment of all other
creditors.").
120. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
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Just as the Code empowers the bankruptcy court to lift an au-
tomatic stay, it also empowers the court to impose a stay where the
automatic stay provision ordinarily does not apply. Section 105(a) au-
thorizes the bankruptcy court to "issue any order, process, or judg-
ment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
[the Code.]" ' 121 Congress specifically contemplated that courts would
"determine on a case-by-case basis [whether] a particular action...
[that is] harming the estate should be stayed.'2
Thus, section 362 simply makes a rough cut at these matters. It
delineates, at a general level, which types of actions should be stayed
and which should not. The bankruptcy court, however, is always free
either to lift or to impose a stay based on the facts of the case. The
crucial issue to be addressed in these proceedings is whether the party
and the dispute belong in the collective proceeding. 23
The test proposed above for handling government claims based
on the prebankruptcy conduct of the debtor fits comfortably within
this framework. The general presumption for all private creditors is
that they must pursue their claims in the bankruptcy forum. The court,
however, has the power to let them proceed in the nonbankruptcy
forum where appropriate. Similarly, proceedings initiated by the gov-
ernment generally are not to be stayed, but can be in appropriate cir-
cumstances. To be sure, the Code does not compel the bankruptcy
court to consider whether the courts normally defer to the type of
agency action at issue in exercising its discretion. However, it does not
preclude consideration of this factor. Courts thus would be well within
their authority if they were to implement the analysis suggested by this
Article.
Unfortunately, courts and commentators have taken a different
path in explicating the precise contours of the (b)(4) exception. Section
362(b)(4) is written in capacious terms; few of the government's ac-
tivities could not be described as flowing from either its police or reg-
ulatory power. Courts and commentators, however, generally have
refused to give the language its full sweep. Specifically, the courts have
developed two tests to determine whether a governmental proceeding
falls within the (b)(4) exception. Whereas the analysis I propose flows
121. Id. § 105(a).
122. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADiN. NEWS 5837.
123. Unfortunately, courts often fail to limit their consideration of stay issues to this
question and inadvertently answer a second question: namely, whether the government's claim
has priority over competing claims. For a discussion of this point, see Jackson, Of Liquidation,
Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60
Am. BA NR. L.J. 399, 419-20 (1986).
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directly from a consideration of the normative underpinnings of both
bankruptcy and administrative law, the judicially crafted tests fail to
address these concerns.
The most commonly used test asks whether the primary purpose
of the government's pursuit of the debtor is to protect its pecuniary
interest. If it is, the (b)(4) exception does not apply, and the govern-
ment then must pursue the debtor only in the bankruptcy forum. This
test, formulated by the Eighth Circuit in Missouri v. United States
Bankruptcy Court,124 has its origin in remarks made by Senator
DeConcini and Representative Edwards during the passage of the Code.
They asserted that the (b)(4) exception "is intended to be given a nar-
row construction in order to permit governmental units to pursue ac-
tions to protect the public health and safety and not to apply to actions
by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property of
the debtor or property of the estate. ' ' 125
There are three things to note about this "pecuniary interest" test.
First, it finds no basis in the language of the Bankruptcy Code. Section
(b)(4) speaks in terms of the nature of the government's power, not
its motivation. One could stare at section 362(b)(4) for days and never
have any inkling that the crucial inquiry is whether the government
is attempting to protect the public fisc. The test cannot be justified
by a simple citation to the Code.
The second problem with the pecuniary interest test is that it has
no normative justification. Saying that the government's motivation
should matter is a long way from justifying such a conclusion. While
my use of the basic principles of administrative law provides a ra-
tionale for adopting its analysis, there is no bankruptcy reason for
drawing the line that the pecuniary interest test creates. An example
illustrates the point. All would agree that an employee who had ex-
hausted her administrative remedies and was about to file suit in dis-
trict court under Title V11126 would have to pursue her claim in the
bankruptcy arena once her employer filed for bankruptcy. 127 Yet if the
124. 647 F.2d 768, 775-77 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982).
125. 124 CoNG. REc. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6505, 6513; 124 CONG. Rc. H11089
(daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG.
& ADMIN. NEws 6436, 6444-45. Justice Scalia, consistent with his general attitude toward
legislative history, recently has refused to rely on similar remarks in construing the Code. See
Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2267-69 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a persuasive
counter-argument to Justice Scalia's disdain for legislative history, see Zeppos, Legislative
History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Inter-
pretation, 76 VA. L. Rav. 1295 (1990).
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988).
127. See, e.g., Revere Copper Prods., Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., 29
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), in process-
ing the claim, decided to litigate on behalf of the claimant, the pe-
cuniary interest test would allow the claim to go forward in United
States district court.' 2 In both cases, the claims are the same in that
they require the court to decide whether the employer violated Title
VII. The simple fact that the government would not be protecting its
own pecuniary interest while the private employee might is not a good
reason for resolving these identical claims in different forums.
My analysis would require the EEOC to pursue its claim inside
of bankruptcy. This result intuitively makes sense. There is no reason
to suppose that the bankruptcy forum suddenly becomes inappropriate
because the EEOC becomes the litigant. The courts that have allowed
the EEOC to continue its action outside the bankruptcy forum have
offered no reason for this differential treatment other than the naked
assertion that the government was not attempting to protect its pe-
cuniary interest.129
A formalistic response to this criticism might be that (b)(4) speaks
only of governmental entities; that while private individuals may also
be enforcing public policy, they simply cannot be shoehorned into the
language of section 362(b)(4). This response rings hollow. Having jet-
tisoned the language of the Code in fashioning the pecuniary interest
test, it makes little sense to fall back on it in attempting to justify the
results the test produces.
The final difficulty with the pecuniary interest test is a practical
one-it is by no means easy to apply. 130 Part of this difficulty arises
from that fact that the pecuniary interest test raises, but does not an-
swer, the question of whose motivation counts. It fails to distinguish
between the motivation of the legislature which passed the legislation'
and that of the official(s) attempting to enforce it. To be sure, one
arbitrarily could pick one or the other, but this hardly justifies the
choice. In any event, as Justice Kennedy recently noted, an inquiry
Bankr. 584, 588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 32 Bankr. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (private actions
based on private attorney general rationale not eligible for (b)(4) treatment).
128. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 789 F.2d 1011, 1013-14 (3d Cir. 1986);
EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 324-25 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910
(1986).
129. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 789 F.2d at 1013-14; Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d at 324-
25.
130. See Note, The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act's Police or Regulatory Power Exemption
to the Automatic Stay: Unnecessary, Unfounded, and Unrestrained, 29 WM. & MARY L. Rv.
855, 856 (1988) (authored by Robert E. Korroch) ("Various courts interpreting the same statute
and legislative history have arrived at astonishingly divergent applications of the law.").
131. If such a thing as congressional intent can be said to exist in a meaningful sense. See
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HA~v. L. R v. 863, 871-72 (1930).
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into the government's motivation "would be amorphous and specu-
lative, and would mire the courts in the quagmire of differentiating
among the multiple purposes that underlie every proceeding. ' 132
The most troubling feature of the pecuniary interest test is its
implicit assumption that bankruptcy courts somehow are incapable of
assessing nonpecuniary interests. This assumption must underlie the
pecuniary interest test; otherwise there would be no point in allowing
the nonbankruptcy forum to render a judgment which oftentimes can-
not be enforced outside of the bankruptcy forum."' Yet bankruptcy
courts have no inherent shortcoming that would suggest such a lim-
itation. Indeed, bankruptcy courts regularly assess nonpecuniary in-
terests.13 4 One must identify what it is about the government's interest,
pecuniary or otherwise, that calls the bankruptcy court's competence
into question and justifies resort to the nonbankruptcy forum. In sum,
the judiciary's use of the pecuniary interest test to demarcate the limits
of the (b)(4) exception has little to commend itself.
132. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 453 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). As an
illustration of this problem, consider the ruling in In re Commonwealth Cos., 80 Bankr. 162
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1987), rev'd, 913 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1990). Prior to the debtors' bankruptcy
filing, the government brought suit against them and five other defendants under the civil
fraud provisions of the False Claims Act. False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat.
877, 978-79 (1982) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729-31 (1988)). The debtors then
filed for bankruptcy. The government filed for relief in the bankruptcy court, arguing that it
was exempt from the stay under the (b)(4) exception, and in the alternative that the court
should lift the stay under 362(d) because the nonbankruptcy proceedings soon would go to
trial. The bankruptcy court, using the pecuniary interest test, held that the (b)(4) exception
did not apply to the False Claims Act suit, and that concerns of judicial economy are not
"sufficientfly] compelling circumstances to lift the stay." Commonwealth Cos., 80 Bankr. at
166.
At first blush, the court's application of the pecuniary interest test seems correct. After all,
the government was suing the debtor for money damages. It appears that the government was
protecting its pecuniary interest. Yet there is another interest at stake: the public's interest in
deterring those who might be tempted to defraud the government. It cannot be denied that
the public has a legitimate-and nonpecuniary interest-in seeing that those who deal with the
government deal with it fairly. The bankruptcy court offered no criteria for assessing whether
the first interest dominates the second. Moreover, it is unclear why the fact that the government
was pursuing an interest unrelated to its pocketbook was not in and of itself sufficient to
exempt the suit from the automatic stay.
Equally troubling is the court's refusal to consider concerns of judicial economy. It is just
such concerns that as a general matter force nonbankruptcy actions into bankruptcy once a
petition is filed. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. This being the case, it makes
little sense to jettison these considerations in deciding whether or not to lift the stay.
133. This is the case when the EEOC brings suit under Title VII against a debtor who
faces liquidation. The only possible relief in this situation is monetary (back pay), which
clearly cannot be enforced by virtue of § 362(b)(5).
134. See, e.g., In re Feddral Press Co., 116 Bankr. 650, 653-54 (Bankr. D. Ind. 1989)
(court estimates probable tort award, including pain and suffering); In re Attlebrook Properties,
37 Bankr. 338, 340 (D. Mass. 1983) (court estimates probable award for breach of contract,
sex discrimination, and infliction of emotional distress).
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Some courts have used a second test to determine whether or not
the government action at issue falls within the (b)(4) exception. This
test asks whether the proceeding at issue attempts to enforce a "public
policy.' ' 35 This test does correct some of the shortcomings of the pe-
cuniary interest test, such as the lack of a statutory foundation and
the difficulty of application. Yet it too fails to withstand scrutiny.
Almost every suit, regardless of the identity of the litigants, promotes
some public policy. Few would contest that this is true in the case of
private actions under Title VII. But it is also true of routine private
disputes, such as contract actions. The government heavily subsidizes
the enforcement of contracts by providing a mechanism to ensure that
disputes are resolved and that recalcitrant parties are forced to adhere
to the deals they have made. Enforcing contracts, compensating those
injured by others' negligence, and resolving property disputes all are
part of the nation's "public policy." As previously noted, however,
it is not feasible to have bankruptcy simply stay all debt collection
efforts pending resolution of all disputes outside the bankruptcy fo-
rum. 136 That the government is enforcing a "public policy" thus does
not seem to be an adequate reason for allowing it to escape the stric-
tures of bankruptcy's automatic stay provisions.
The unsatisfying nature of these proffered methods of inter-
preting (b)(4) stems from their failure to ask why the government should
be allowed to proceed against the debtor outside of bankruptcy. Ex-
amining the issue in light of the previous discussion, it becomes ap-
parent that the courts err in focusing either on the nature of the
governmental interest or on whether there is a public policy involved.
The question that they should focus on is the extent to which sub-
stituting the bankruptcy forum for the nonbankruptcy forum alters
the substance of the dispute. By doing this, courts can give meaning
to both the (b)(4) exception and to their discretionary powers under
sections 362(d) and 105(a).
As mentioned earlier, the automatic stay contains another ex-
ception that explicitly mentions the government: section 362(b)(1),
which allows all criminal proceedings against the debtor to go forward.
This provision, to the extent that it applies to corporate debtors, con-
flicts with the normative integration of the government into the bank-
ruptcy process. Applying (b)(1) to corporate cases leads to
unsatisfactory results, as is easily demonstrated. The False Claims Act
135. See NLRB v. Continental Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1991);
Eddleman v. United States Dep't of Labor, 923 F.2d 782, 790-91 (10th Cir. 1991); NLRB v.
Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934, 941-43 (6th Cir. 1986).
136. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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has both civil and criminal components. a7 While the standard of proof
differs depending on the context, there is no reason to believe that
the bankruptcy court is less able to consider one standard than the
other. To be sure, (b)(1) works perfectly well in the great majority of
bankruptcy cases-those involving individual debtors. In the case of
the corporate debtor, however, courts should exercise their discretion
to allow the proceeding to take place in the bankruptcy forum, or
Congress should amend (b)(1) to exclude corporate debtors.
The proper treatment of prepetition disputes between the gov-
ernment and the debtor thus is clear. If the government seeks to take
action to which a court would normally defer, the bankruptcy court
should allow the government to take that action. If, however, the gov-
ernment merely wishes to bring suit in another judicial forum, there
is no reason that the government should not be treated as a private
creditor. Although the Code allows for the implementation of this
result, courts have gone astray by focusing on matters that have little
relevance to the question at hand.
C. Postpetition, Preconfirmation Conduct
In this section I consider the last time period during which a deb-
tor's conduct may lead it into a dispute with the government: namely,
after the petition has been filed but before the bankruptcy process has
ended.
(1) Bankruptcy Theory
If a bankruptcy proceeding could be conducted instantaneously,
determining which actions should be forced into bankruptcy's collec-
tive proceeding would be relatively straightforward. All actions based
on postpetition conduct would be resolved in the nonbankruptcy fo-
rum according to nonbankruptcy law, while actions based on pre-
petition conduct would be resolved in bankruptcy so long as the
bankruptcy forum provided an adequate method of resolving the dis-
pute. Where the bankruptcy forum proved inadequate, the nonbank-
ruptcy forum would resolve the merits of the dispute.
In fact, however, bankruptcy proceedings take time to complete.
The question thus arises as to the proper forum for resolving disputes
based on the debtor's conduct while in bankruptcy. Once again, con-
sider the case of the private creditor. The difficulty here is that there
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988) (criminal False Claims Act); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3732
(1988) (Civil False Claims Act).
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are in fact two different types of disputes that may arise. The first,
and most common, is the one in which the creditor is seeking to re-
cover money for the debtor's conduct while in bankruptcy. As an il-
lustration of this situation, consider the case where one of the debtor's
trucks hits claimant the day after the debtor filed for bankruptcy.
Claimant asserts that the driver of the truck was negligent and was
acting in the scope of her employment. The debtor disputes both as-
sertions.
Clearly, had the accident happened the day before the debtor filed
for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court would be the appropriate forum
in which to litigate the dispute. 3 8 Conversely, had the accident hap-
pened the day after the bankruptcy proceeding concluded, the dispute
would have to be resolved in the applicable nonbankruptcy forum. In
our situation, however, the accident occurred neither before the pe-
tition was filed nor after the bankruptcy case had concluded. Though
we now have a third situation, we still have the choice of two alter-
native forums: bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy. Choosing between these
two, however, is not difficult. Consider the case of a debtor who is
going to be liquidated. In this case, there is little reason to resolve the
dispute in the nonbankruptcy forum. Allowing the bankruptcy forum
to resolve it gives rise to the administrative savings that justify such
a resolution in the case of the prepetition creditor. The only change
in analysis occurs if one concludes that the claimant should receive
an administrative expense priority, giving the claimant priority over
all prepetition unsecured creditors. 39 If the claimant is given priority,
then the dispute may involve real dollars rather than the few pennies
on the dollar that unsecured claimants normally receive. Yet the sav-
ings that result from not delaying the resolution of the bankruptcy
proceeding and from reducing the number of forums in which the
debtor must litigate still argue for resolution of the dispute inside of
bankruptcy.
This analysis remains the same in the case where the debtor will
emerge from bankruptcy. The debtor's plan of reorganization must
take account of the claimant's interest in the firm, regardless of whether
138. For claims arising before bankruptcy, the court may either set the amount of the
claim, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1988), or estimate the amount of the claim, id. § 502(c).
139. See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 483 (1968). One can attack the normative
justification of giving postpetition tort creditors, as opposed to consensual creditors, an
administrative expense priority. See T.H. JACKSON, Loaic AND Lwnrs, supra note 9, at 154-
56. If one concluded that postpetition tort claimants should be treated the same as prepetition
tort claimants, it is clear that the dispute should be resolved in the bankruptcy forum. The
analysis as to consensual creditors, who have to be given priority to induce them to deal with
the debtor, would be the same as in the text.
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it is given priority. Thus, the savings that will result from having the
debtor litigate in one forum and from not delaying the conclusion of
the bankruptcy proceeding dictate that the claimant's dispute with the
debtor be resolved in the bankruptcy arena.
Before examining the proper treatment of the government, it is
necessary to consider a different situation that may arise while the
debtor is in bankruptcy-the case where a private party wants to pre-
vent the debtor from engaging in certain future conduct. Assume that
after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy, one of its factories begins
to emit a terrible noise. Assume further that under state law, Home-
owner, who lives next to the factory, has an action for abatement.
In this scenario, part of the rationale for supplanting the nonbank-
ruptcy forum evaporates. As in the case of the tort claimant who re-
ceives an administrative expense priority, we are no longer talking about
a fractional payout. If the debtor is ordered either to abate its current
activities or to engage in new ones, its expenses must be paid in full-
at a hundred cents on the dollar.
Unlike the case of the tort claimant, however, allowing those seek-
ing injunctive relief to proceed in the nonbankruptcy forum does not
necessarily threaten the efficacy of the collective proceeding. To be
sure, it probably still is cheaper for the debtor to litigate in one forum
rather than two. Allowing the nuisance litigation to proceed in the
nonbankruptcy forum, however, is unlikely to threaten the successful
resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding. Although there may be iso-
lated cases where the difference between reorganization and liqui-
dation turns on the ability of the debtor to engage in some specified
conduct, most disputes do not implicate such concerns. For example,
many actions for prospective relief involve claims by workers who seek
reinstatement on the grounds that they were discharged in violation
of Title VII. In such cases, it would only delay completion of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding to have the bankruptcy court litigate the Title VII
claim.
Thus, in the case of prospective relief, the presumption should
be that the dispute will be resolved by the nonbankruptcy forum. This
presumption can be overcome by a showing that the resolution of the
dispute will impact heavily on the ultimate resolution of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding.
One note of caution must be added regarding the distinction be-
tween those with retrospective claims and those with prospective claims.
Oftentimes, one can be converted to the other through clever pleading.
For example, an action seeking the cost of cleaning up a site polluted
during bankruptcy could either be a claim for money damages or a
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suit for an injunction ordering the debtor to clean up the site. To ferret
out true prospective relief cases, it is helpful to ask whether the party
seeking relief still would be before the court if the debtor's operations
had been shut down, its assets sold for scrap, and distribution of the
monies generated by the sale was the only task left for the bankruptcy
court. If so, then the party is seeking relief based on the debtor's com-
pleted conduct and should be treated as any other claimant. If li-
quidation would eliminate the party's complaint, then it is seeking
prospective relief, and its suit should be heard in the appropriate non-
bankruptcy forum.
With the rules governing the treatment of the private creditor
firmly in mind, the case where the government sues the debtor based
on its conduct while in bankruptcy can be considered. Where the gov-
ernment pursues the debtor for monetary damages or its equivalent,
the analysis is identical to that sketched out in section B of this Part;
where the proceeding is in the administrative forum, and courts nor-
mally would defer to that forum's decision, the proceeding should
remain there. In this situation, it is impossible to translate the non-
bankruptcy right into the bankruptcy forum. However, once the dis-
pute moves to the judicial battlefield, the presumption should be that
it will be handled in the collective proceeding.
In addition, where the government seeks only prospective relief,
the baseline should be, as it is in the case of the private creditor, that
the litigation will continue outside of bankruptcy. Where the non-
bankruptcy forum is administrative rather than judicial, this pre-
sumption is even stronger than in the private context. In this situation,
the added factors of administrative expertise and political accounta-
bility require an absolute rule that the proceeding remain outside of
the collective proceeding.
(2) The Code and Case Law
The Bankruptcy-Code as currently written follows the above anal-
ysis only in part. Nothing in the Code purports to stay attempts to
pursue the debtor outside of bankruptcy for conduct engaged in after
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The automatic stay only reaches
attempts to enforce a claim which arose before the petition was filed. 140
The Code thus not only allows suits seeking prospective relief to go
forward outside of bankruptcy, but also allows nonbankruptcy forums
to resolve all disputes based solely on the debtor's postpetition con-
duct.
140. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
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Despite this relatively clear line established by the Code, bank-
ruptcy courts on occasion have asserted jurisdiction over proceedings
involving the debtor's postpetition conduct. In two recent decisions,
in fact, bankruptcy courts have asserted jurisdiction where the matter
should have been left in the nonbankruptcy forum. The first of these
cases involved the bankruptcy of the MCorp holding company, which
found itself in bankruptcy as a result of the Texas banking crisis.' 4'
MCorp is a holding company which owns both banking and non-
banking subsidiaries. Because of failing real estate loans, the Federal
Reserve Board took over most of MCorp's banking subsidiaries. 42 The
Board then initiated administrative proceedings against MCorp. One
aspect of these proceedings involved allegations that MCorp had vi-
olated the self-dealing restrictions of federal banking law; the other
involved an attempt to force MCorp to comply with the Board's reg-
ulation providing that the holding company be a "source of financial
strength" to its subsidiary banks. 43 MCorp sought to enjoin these
proceedings on the ground that enforcement of the Board's regulation
would interfere with the bankruptcy process.
The district court granted MCorp's requested injunction. The court
noted that "[p]reclusion by the bankruptcy forum ... would restrict
the Board's supervision of MCorp's asset allocation, intra-group
transactions, and third-party contracts."' 44 In granting the injunction,
the court concluded that its duty under the Code was to "evaluate the
function of the regulation, the probability of direct public harm, the
opportunity for the public interest to be effectively represented in the
bankruptcy proceeding, and the relation between the regulation and
the financial, legal, and structural requirements for an effective re-
organization."'' 45 In other words, the court undertook to balance what
it perceived as the conflicting goals of banking regulation on the one
hand, and the bankruptcy process on the other.' 46
The court's analysis contains two errors. The first is its conclusion
that a conflict exists between bankruptcy policy and banking policy.
To be sure, it may be easier for a bank holding company to reorganize
if it does not have to comply with the legal regulations governing bank-
141. In re MCorp, 101 Bankr. 483, 485 (S.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd sub noma. MCorp Fin. v.
Board of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 1101 (1991).
142. Id. at 485.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 487.
145. Id. at 489.
146. See id. at 490 (court characterizes its order as an "accommodation of the two national
interests in bankruptcy and banking").
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ing entities. This fact, however, does not implicate bankruptcy policy.
Bankruptcy policy, properly focused, should be limited to solving the
collective action problem that arises when a debtor's liabilities exceed
its assets. Bankruptcy should not be a haven from the rigors of the
marketplace. 147
The MCorp court's decision suffers from a second defect as well.
In ousting the Board of jurisdiction, the court attempted to mollify
concerned regulators by noting that it would "prevent individual or
collusive efforts to evade the Debtor's responsibilities to the public.' 48
The court apparently believed it could perform the responsibilities en-
trusted to the Board. While one may admire the court's attempt to
ensure that the debtor's "responsibilities" are fulfilled, the fact is that
the court is not institutionally competent to discharge this function.
Congress established the Board as the expert regulator in this area;
it is not possible to shift this task to the bankruptcy court without
altering the contours of nonbankruptcy law.
The bankruptcy court committed a similar error in the recent- case
of In re Public Service Co. 49 The Public Service Company of New
Hampshire ("PS New Hampshire") was a public utility supplying elec-
trical service. Like most government-sanctioned monopolies, it was a
profitable venture. The firm, however, had the misfortune to invest
heavily in the star-crossed Seabrook nuclear power plant. The plant
became one of the primary targets of antinuclear opposition in this
country, and only recently has received regulatory approval to begin
operations. This delay in bringing Seabrook on line created severe fi-
nancial problems for PS New Hampshire. New Hampshire law pro-
hibits the company from charging its customers for monies spent on
incomplete projects. This prohibition, coupled with the amount of
money PS New Hampshire had "invested" in Seabrook, left the utility
company unable to meet its obligations, and thus forced it to file for
reorganization. 150
147. In In re Buttonwood Partners, Ltd., Ill Bankr. 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), the
bankruptcy court made the same mistake:
Mhis Court finds that its jurisdiction and power over the debtor's estate takes
precedence over the authority vested in the [Office of Thrift Supervision].... A
result which would preclude this court from considering a balancing with respect to
the application of the specific regulations that may be implicated, would interfere
with the ability of this Debtor to effectively reorganize under Chapter 11 and
contradict the 'fresh-start' policy which underlies the Code.
Id. at 61 (emphasis in original).
148. MCorp, 101 Bankr. at 489.
149. 88 Bankr. 558 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988)
150. Public Serv. Co., 88 Bankr. at 559-560.
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PS New Hampshire filed a plan of reorganization designed to
circumvent the restrictions imposed by New Hampshire law. The pro-
posed plan would have transformed PS New Hampshire from a single
entity into a holding company owning three separate subsidiaries.",
One of these subsidiaries would generate and transmit electricity. A
second would be the retail distributor of the electricity. The third would
control the planning, engineering, accounting, and financial support
services for the other two entities. Creating the first two entities would
allow the utility company to sell its electricity wholesale from the first
to the second subsidiary. Such wholesale electricity transactions are
regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
rather than the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission. 15 2 Unlike
New Hampshire law, the applicable federal regulations would have
allowed the utility to charge its customers for a portion of the costs
of the Seabrook plant before the plant was operational.'53
Had PS New Hampshire attempted such a reorganization outside
of bankruptcy, it would have had to obtain approval from the New
Hampshire Public Utilities Commission. 5 4 State law allowed the Com-
mission to grant approval where it determined the change in structure
would be in the "public interest.""' The utility argued that the bank-
ruptcy court could invoke section 1123(a)(5) of the Code, and approve
the proposed reorganization, without requiring the utility to obtain the
necessary state consent. Section 1123(a)(5) provides that
"[n]otwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a
plan shall ... provide adequate means for [its] implementation
''156
The bankruptcy court began its analysis of PS New Hampshire's
plan by examining the historical treatment of regulated industries in
bankruptcy. 1 7 Under the old Bankruptcy Act, when an intrastate util-
ity filed for bankruptcy, its plan of reorganization could be approved
only if the governing regulatory body consented. 5 " The only provision
of the 1978 Code speaking to the treatment of regulated industries is
section 1129(a)(6), which requires regulatory approval for rate in-
151. In re Public Serv. Co., 108 Bankr. 854, 860 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989).
152. Id.
153. Id. at n.4.
154. Id. at 860.
155. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 369:1 (1984) (issuance of securities approved only if
consistent with public good); Petition of New Hampshire Gas & Elec. Co., 88 N.H. 50, 57,
184 A. 602, 607 (1936) (goal of statute is to avoid overcapitalization contrary to public interest).
156. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) (1988).
157. Public Serv. Co., 108 Bankr. at 863-66.
158. U.S.C. § 578 (repealed 1979).
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creases. 159 As initially enacted, section 1123(a)(5) did not have the
"notwithstanding" language.'6 This language was added in 1984, in
what was labelled a "technical amendment."'' 6'
The court thus concluded that the "plain language" of section
1123(a)(5) allowed it, over the state's objections, to approve a plan
of reorganization transferring regulatory authority to FERC. 16 2 The
court stated that "issues dealing with imminent threats to public health
and safety are accorded overriding importance notwithstanding bank-
ruptcy proceedings."' 63 The court found, however, that less solici-
tousness was necessary where '"economic regulation" was at issue.'6
The court also opined that it was capable of considering the public
interest. 65
As my prior analysis has made clear, the bankruptcy court's de-
cision cannot be justified on a normative level. The court believed that
its consideration of the public interest was an adequate substitute for
the utility commission's determination of the public interest. Yet it is
the New Hampshire regulatory commission, not the bankruptcy court,
which was created to become an expert in the field and determine what
is in the public interest. Only if the standard framework of admin-
istrative law is ignored can it be asserted that a bankruptcy court is
a competent substitute for an administrative agency.
Though the court can be faulted for viewing itself as an adequate
substitute for the utilities commission, its statutory argument is not
without some force. The language of the Code does say "notwith-
standing."' 1 6 This argument, however, is not as strong as it might first
appear. It is not clear that the language of section 1123(a)(5) com-
mands the court's result. Section 1123(a)(5) does not say that the bank-
ruptcy court is free to ignore nonbankruptcy law in approving a plan
of reorganization. Rather, it sets forth various changes that a plan may
effect, such as the merger of the debtor with another entity, the
amendment of its charter, and the sale of the debtor's property free
of any lien. 67
The considerations that have been stressed in this Article suggest
why these actions can be taken notwithstanding nonbankruptcy law.
159. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(6) (1988).
160. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) (1979, repealed 1984).
161. See S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1983); 130 CONG. REc. S8887, 8888
(daily ed. June 29, 1984).
162. In re Public Serv. Co., 108 Bankr. 854, 874-80 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989).
163. Id. at 870 (emphasis in original).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 873.
166. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) (1988).
167. See id.
August 1991] 1609
These are actions that the debtor has the ability to take on its own
initiative, outside of bankruptcy, so long as it complies with certain
procedural requirements. These procedures, however, are adequately
duplicated in the collective proceeding, something which is not true
of the requirement of obtaining the approval of the state regulatory
commission. This argument is bolstered by section 1129(a)(6), which
requires that any rate change be approved by the appropriate regu-
latory body. 168 It is clear that PS New Hampshire was, through its plan
of reorganization, attempting to procure a rate change in the sense
that the new plan would allow it to charge its customers higher rates.
Regardless of whether one accepts this statutory argument, the
more important point is that the court's decision transgresses the proper
relationship between bankruptcy and the administrative state.
Conclusion
The extant scope of the administrative state ensures that public
law will intrude upon the conduct of private firms. This intrusion is
not magically eliminated by the expedient of filing a bankruptcy pe-
tition. The extent to which such an action should transfer govern-
mental disputes involving a debtor into the bankruptcy arena turns
on a careful consideration of the relative institutional competence of
the bankruptcy court and the competing forum. Where the competing
forum is another court, the bankruptcy court is equally equipped to
resolve the issue. While at times there may be reasons for allowing
the litigation to proceed outside of bankruptcy, institutional com-
petence is not one of those reasons. Where the competing forum is
an administrative agency whose decisions receive deference by re-
viewing courts, bankruptcy courts are not designed to replicate the
agency's decisionmaking process. Any attempt to translate such dis-
putes into bankruptcy necessarily changes the substantive law at issue.
The concerns of expertise and political accountability encompassed in
the notion of deference to agency decisions are best served, and bank-
ruptcy goals are not ill served, by allowing these disputes to be resolved
in the administrative forum.
168. Id. § 1129(a)(6).
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